In 2014, Chen et al. proposed a one-way hash self-healing group key distribution scheme for resource-constrained wireless networks in the journal of Sensors (14(14):24358-24380, doi: 10.3390/ s141224358). They asserted that their Scheme 2 achieves mt-revocation capability, mt-wise forward secrecy, any-wise backward secrecy and has mt-wise collusion attack resistance capability. Unfortunately, this paper pointed out that their scheme does not satisfy the forward security, mt-revocation capability and mt-wise collusion attack resistance capability.
Introduction
Group communication includes a group manager (GM) and some group members, in which all of the group members share a common session key which is distributed by GM. In order to achieve secure group communication in unreliable wireless networks, Staddon et al. [1] introduced a group key distribution scheme with self-healing mechanism, which allows a group member to recover session keys even if he doesn't receive the corresponding broadcast messages because of packet loss, without requesting anything to the group manager. Recently, Chen et al. [2] developed two schemes to realize the self-healing group key distribution based on one-way hash chain. The proposed Scheme 2 has the constant storage overhead and low communication overhead, thus is very suitable for the resource-constrained wireless networks. They assert that their scheme is secure, i.e., satisfies mt-revocation capability, mt-wise forward secrecy, any-wise backward secrecy and resistance to mt-wise collusion attack. Unfortunately, we found a revoked user can recover other legitimate users' personal secrets which can be used to recover the current session's session key, this directly breaks the forward security, mt-revocation capability and mt-wise collusion attack resistance capability. Thus, Chen et al.'s Scheme 2 is insecure.
Overview of Chen et al.'s Scheme
Chen et al.'s self-healing group key distribution Scheme 2 includes five parts: Set up, Broadcast in session j, Group session key recovery and self-healing, Group member addition and Group member revocation. Here we only describe the first three parts which is helpful to understand the attack.
(1) Set up
The GM selects a random 2t-degree polynomial s 1 (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a 2t x 2t and a random
. Then, the GM chooses a random value ε 1 from F q . The GM sends the user's personal secret
} be the set of revoked users before and in session j, where R j j is the set of users who join the group in session j and are revoked before and in session j. R
are the IDs of users in R j j . R j j = ∅ if no users joined the group in session j .
-The GM chooses a random value k 0 j ∈ F q and a one-way hash function h(·). Note that h i (·) denotes applying i times hash operation. Then GM constructs the j-th key chain for session j: {k } are random numbers which are not used as a user ID and different from each other. Then, the GM computes
-The GM chooses a random session key K j from F q . Then, the GM computes
After that, the GM broadcasts the message
symmetric encryption function. (3) Group session key recovery and self-healing
Any legitimate user U i ∈ G j j can recover the j-th session key when he receives the broadcast message B j as follows.
-U i uses his personal secret ε j · s 1 (i) and ε j · s 2 (i) to compute
-U i uses the hash function h(·) to compute all {k j j } for j < j ≤ j in the j-th key chain.
with corresponding keys {k j j }(j < j ≤ j).
Cryptanalysis of Chen et al.'s Scheme 2
In this section we exhibit the attack on Chen et al.'s Scheme 2 step by step, and explain why this attack exists.
Attack on Chen et al.'s Scheme 2
Let G j j 1 denote the users who join the group in session j and are still legitimate in session j 1 where j < j 1 . Suppose that U i ∈ G j j 1 and U i is revoked in session j 2 (j < j 1 < j 2 ). Now we are ready to show how U i , who is revoked in session j 2 , recovers the personal secret of another user who is legitimate in session j 2 , furthermore uses this personal secret to compute the session key K j 2 which should be kept secret from U i .
Step 1. U i computes k 
Step 2. In session j , U i receives the broadcast messages
and
Note that k
With the values of k j j which is computed from step (1), U i can obtain
Step 3. Since U i is legitimate in session j 1 , U i can obtain the similar result in the same way:
Let Equation (4) -Equation (5), user U i can obtain
Step 4. U i computes ε j · s 2 (x) as
Take ε j · s 2 (x) to Equation (3), U i computes ε j · s 1 (x) as
Step 5. U i gets a legitimate user's identity, v, in session j 2 by observing R j j where j > j 2 .
